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Abstract
We conduct an experiment where participants choose between actions that provide private
benefits but may also impose losses on others. Three legal environments are compared: no law,
strict liability for harm caused to third parties, and an efficiently designed negligence rule where
damages are paid only when the harmful action generates a net social loss. Legal obligations are
either perfectly enforced (Severe Law) or only weakly so (Mild Law), i.e., expected sanctions are
then nondeterrent. We find that behavior can be rationalized in terms of individuals trading-off
private benefits, net of legal liability, against the net uncompensated losses caused to others.
The weight associated with non incentivized efficiency concerns is increased by the introduction
of a liability rule, whether deterrent or not, and there is evidence that the effect is stronger
under strict liability than under the negligence rule.
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11 Introduction
Actions causing harm to third parties are often governed by liability rules which allow the harmed
parties to claim compensation from the tortfeasor. A main purpose of such rules is to deter so-
cially inefficient behavior generating negative externalities. Under the so-called strict liability rule,
tortfeasors are required to compensate the harm they caused irrespective of precautions or circum-
stances. Under the negligence rule, they are required to compensate if their behavior fell short of
some legal standard of conduct given the circumstances. In either case, and provided the negligence
rule is appropriately designed, the standard prediction is that perfectly enforced liability rules will
yield socially efficient decisions in the sense of maximizing overall welfare. Conversely, when legal
liability is nonexistent or is imperfectly enforced, for instance when tortfeasors are seldom detected,
the standard prediction is that socially inefficient behavior will be under-deterred.
There are reasons to question these predictions. A voluminous literature in behavioral economics
shows that individuals are not purely motivated by their material self-interest, e.g., they may also be
concerned by others’ wellbeing or may be motivated by reciprocity or self-image considerations. On
the one hand, the existence of other-oriented motives is likely to decrease opportunistic and socially
inefficient behavior, and might therefore usefully complement poorly enforced liability rules. On the
other hand, such motives may also generate inefficiencies by driving out self-interested but socially
efficient behavior, i.e., they could lead to over-deterrence of actions causing harm to others. In
addition, the literature has showed that material sanctions may crowd in or crowd out informal
motivations. Should crowding out occur, the efficiency gains of formal liability rules would be
smaller when enforcement costs are taken into account.
We investigate how individuals react to liability rules under different settings. Our objective
is threefold. First, we aim at evaluating the effect of introducing liability rules: Do theoretically
equivalent canonical liability rules achieve similar levels of efficiency? Are they able to perform
better than the benchmark scenario without legal rules, even when the rules are poorly enforced
and are in principle nondeterrent? Second, we seek to understand to which extent liability rules
are able to influence individual behavior beyond the changes in material incentives they generate:
Do deviations in behavior from the no-law scenario result solely from payoff relevant deterrence
effects? Do liability rules crowd in or crowd out concerns for the group? Third, we investigate how
behavior regulated by liability rules is perceived by individuals. Do individuals express disapproval
of individuals who cause harm to others? Does it matter if causing harm was socially efficient?
Or do individuals mostly express disapproval of those who violated standards established by the
liability rules? Does the type of rule then matter?
To answer these questions, we develop a Liability Game that shares with Public Good exper-
iments the property that each participant’s final payoff depends on what other participants do.
Individuals repeatedly interact in a Stranger Matching protocol and are both potential tortfeasors
and victims. This replicates many real-life situations where individuals can both cause harm and
suffer harm caused by others, e.g., one may be both a driver and a pedestrian, each tenant in an
apartment building may impose nuisances on others, each worker in a plant may put others at
risk. As in many everyday situation, negative externalities can result from either socially ineffi-
cient or socially efficient actions, depending on the private circumstances of each individual. Ex
ante, our participants face the same probability distribution of circumstances. Ex post, however,
when actions must be chosen, participants will be in different circumstances and will not know the
circumstances of others. Typically, in our experiment, socially efficient behavior leads to unequal
payoffs. Participants also have the possibility to express disapproval of other group members at the
end of each period after the realization of payoffs. Sanctions can be either symbolic (non-monetary
punishment) or involve small costs to both parties (monetary punishment).
2We introduce treatment variations with respect to the legal rules and the enforcement policy.
We compare the cases where behavior is regulated by standard liability rules (i.e., strict liability or
the negligence rule) to a benchmark without legal rules (No Law). In addition, we vary the degree
of enforcement of the liability rules and consider the cases where they are either perfectly enforced
(Severe Law) or enforced only with probability one half (Mild Law).
Our results first show that both the strict and negligence liability regimes achieve a substantially
higher level of efficiency than the no-law benchmark scenario. This holds both when liability rules
are perfectly or imperfectly enforced. When rules are perfectly enforced, we confirm the theoretical
prediction that both the negligence rule and strict liability achieve the same level of efficiency.
However, when the legal rules are imperfectly enforced, one of the two liability rules appears to
do better in deterring socially inefficient harm-causing actions. Strict liability outperforms the
negligence rule in this respect. On the other hand, strict liability also appears to over-deter socially
efficient harm-causing actions, a feature that does not arise under the negligence rule. Second, we
show that liability rules affect individual behavior beyond the associated material deterrence effects.
In our setting, social preferences in the form of inequality aversion cannot explain socially efficient
behavior in the No Law or Mild Law treatments, but motivations such as altruism and efficiency
concerns can play a role. When we decompose individual utilities into self-interested and efficiency-
oriented components, we observe larger weights on efficiency concerns under either liability rules
than in the No Law benchmark. This suggests that liability rules crowd in concerns for others’
well-being. Third, we find that participants mainly disapprove of or sanction players who caused
harm, irrespective of the prevailing legal rule or of whether the harmful action is socially efficient.
In the standard approach of Law and Economics, legal liability for harm amounts to the price put
on harmful behavior. However, there are clearly other dimensions, in addition to the threat of legal
sanctions. Legal liability increases the salience of harmful actions by categorizing them as actions
that trigger a right to compensation, perhaps only in some circumstances. When harmful actions
would otherwise arise anonymously, legal liability also make these actions attributable, which allow
informal sanctions to come at play. Although liability rules do not prohibit any particular actions,
they may also convey the message that some actions are not right, at least in some circumstances,
which may influence behavior by itself, a moral suasion or normative effect. Legal liability may also
affect expectations of how others will behave, which in turn influences behavior when preferences
are other-regarding. Our experiment seeks to characterize the overall effects of legal liability.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related experimental literature.
Section 3 presents the experimental design. Section 4 draws on the theoretical literature on social
preferences to derive predictions. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 discusses the interpreta-
tion and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There are relatively few experimental studies of liability rules in the law and economics literature
as such; see Sullivan and Holt (2017). An early paper is Kornhauser and Schotter (1990). They
compare strict liability and the negligence rule in the so-called single-actor (or unilateral) accident
framework where agents can invest in precautions to reduce the probability of causing harm to
others. More recently Angelova et al. (2014) considered No Law, strict liability and the negligence
rule in the same set-up with only two precaution levels (“care” versus “no-care”). They find that
either liability rule provides socially efficient incentives but that roughly half of the subjects also
invest in care under No Law. In both these papers, consistent with the traditional approach in
law and economics (Becker, 1968), legal obligations are backed by deterrent incentives. In our
3experiment, by contrast, the focus is on nondeterrent law. In addition, the occurrence of harm
is non-stochastic, i.e., it follows deterministically from one’s actions. Socially efficient “care” then
depends on the choice between actions given one’s private circumstances.1 Non-stochastic harm
minimizes the potentially confounding effects of risk aversion and of confusion due to the subjects’
computations under uncertainty.
Closely related to this paper is the experimental literature on the effect of “legal obligations” in
linear Public Good games (henceforth PG games). Such games, also known as Voluntary Contribu-
tion Mechanisms, have been widely studied because they epitomize the conflict between self-interest
and group interest in social dilemma situations; see Chaudhuri (2011) and Villeval (2012) for recent
surveys. A smaller strand of this literature has studied the role of weakly incentivized obligations
to contribute to the public good (e.g., Tyran and Feld, 2006; Galbiati and Vertova, 2008, 2014;
Kube and Traxler, 2011; Riedel and Schildberg-Hörisch, 2013). The aim is to test the notion of
“expressive law”, i.e., law not backed by binding incentives as defined in Cooter (1998) or McAdams
and Nadler (2005) among others.2
A rationale often invoked to explain the role of expressive law is that obligations impact behavior
because they affect the individuals’ beliefs about the behavior of others. If individuals have other-
regarding preferences (e.g., inequality aversion or a predisposition for conditional cooperation), social
dilemma situations in terms of material payoffs become coordination games in terms of utilities (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999, 2006). Weakly incentivized obligations can then help coordinating on more
cooperative equilibria. Another rationale is that obligations may play a role by themselves because
of the emotional cost of disobeying obligations. Galbiati and Vertova (2014) show that expressive law
works through both channels. Non-binding obligations influence beliefs, which triggers conditional
contributions. They also affect preferences, which is captured by a rightward shift in the individuals’
conditional contribution schedule, i.e., individuals contribute more even after controlling for their
expectations of others’ behavior.
Recently, Eisenberg and Engel (2014, 2016) addressed some of the most important questions
related to the effect of legal liability and in particular the fact that individuals may attach some
moral value to legal obligations. In their 2014 paper, they use a linear PG game experiment to
explore the deterrent effects of legal damages imposed by “victims” on individuals who do not
efficiently contribute to the public good. They consider treatments where the probability of liability
is in principle not powerful enough to enforce the first best. They find that imperfectly imposed
liability nevertheless has some deterrence effect and that deterrence is sensitive to the certainty of
liability and to its severity, e.g., whether legal demages are compensatory or punitive. In their 2016
contribution, they seek to unpack the motivations to refrain from causing harm in the unilateral
accident framework. The design induces a trade-off between individual profit and a reluctance to
impose harm. The authors find that the negligence rule works through three independent additive
effects: the rule activates norms of conduct, it exposes the plaintiff to disapproval (a formally
expressed blame), and to the risk of having to pay damages (a pecuniary deterrent). Surprisingly,
the informal effects operate even if there is no (human) victim, and therefore no reason to activate
morality.
Our experimental design considers a game, the Liability Game, which shares some features with
canonical PG games but also differs on several dimensions. On the one hand, we study situations
1Our definition of strict liability and the negligence rule is the same as in the economic model of the public
enforcement of law discussed in Polinsky and Shavell (2007). The “accident model” more commonly used in the
theoretical economic analysis of tort law is reviewed in Shavell (2007).
2See Fluet and Galbiati (2016) for a survey. Some of the experimental literature has been concerned with the
“democratic dividend” when non-binding obligations are introduced endogeneously by the participants (Tyran and
Feld, 2006; Markussen et al., 2014).
4where individuals (potentially) face a trade-off between private and social interests, where they are
in symmetrical situations, and where the composition of groups changes over time. These char-
acteristics are shared with many of the canonical PG games. On the other hand, the situations
we consider differ on the following dimensions. First, canonical PG games imply linear returns of
individual contributions such that social efficiency always requires full contribution. While liability
rules also aim at deterring selfish behavior when it runs counter to social welfare, they must be
careful not to deter welfare-increasing selfish strategies. We therefore consider liability rules in an
environment where selfish behavior can either increase or decrease social welfare, depending on cir-
cumstances. Second, the very setting of canonical PG games implies that players know exactly what
decisions other group members should have taken to maximize social welfare (i.e., full contribution
to the public good). In many situations involving liability rules, one cannot directly infer whether
the tortfeasor’s action was socially undesirable. In the Liability Game, imposing a loss on others
might be either welfare increasing or welfare decreasing, according to the (unobserved) situation
the tortfeasor faces. Third, canonical PG games assume perfect information about individual con-
tributions to the public good. Most of the literature on liability rules assumes on the contrary that
the tortfeasor’s action or conditions associated with the action are not directly observable by others
in general, but can be partially or fully revealed by enforcement authorities. The Liability Game
proposes a setting where tortfeasors’ actions are not directly observable. Fourth, canonical PG
games start with a situation where players own their endowment and can partially or fully invest
it in the public good. Situations where liability rules are involved usually consider the opposite:
endowments or equivalently property rights are initially defined and those who suffer a loss caused
by tortfeasors are referred to as victims. Finally, when legal obligations are introduced, there is a
subtle difference in the message conveyed by the obligation. In the canonical PG game, the message
is that one may be fined for not contributing to the public good, which presumably conveys the
obligation to contribute. In our case, as is true of actual liability rules, the explicit message is not
that one should not cause harm but rather that one will need to compensate harm caused, possibly
only in some circumstances or with some probability.
We also borrow from the Public Good games literature the possibility that individuals impose
symbolic or small monetary punishments on others. Informal costly sanctions have been shown to
reduce free-riding, both in the Stranger and Partner matching protocols (Fehr and Gächter, 2000,
2002, among others). We emphasize that our aim here is not to study the extent to which weakly
enforced formal legal sanctions are supplemented by effective informal punishment for bad behavior.
Rather we seek to capture the expression of social disapproval as a reflection of the underlying social
norms. We impose a one-to-one ratio between the small cost to the punished and the small cost to
the punisher. From the literature, we would therefore expect relatively little effect on cooperation
in our experiment.3 We also allow for purely symbolic punishment as an expression of disapproval.
The mere fear of disapproval has also been shown to affect behavior (Masclet et al., 2003; Rege
and Telle, 2004; Noussair and Tucker, 2005; Dugar, 2013). In our Liability Game, however, one’s
actions or circumstances are only imperfectly observed by others. They can be inferred, if at all,
only from the overall frequency of harmful actions or from findings of liability under the prevailing
rule and enforcement policy. As with real life liability rules, subjects are allowed to express diffuse
disapproval of certain actions or more targeted disapproval of individuals who have been found
liable but will otherwise remain strangers. Other participants’ net final payoff always remains
private information.4
3 Social punishment has been shown to be effective in sustaining cooperation in public good games run only when
the ratio is substantially above unity, i.e., a high impact-low cost ratio; see Nikiforakis and Normann (2008), Egas
and Riedl (2008). With the linear punishment technology, a ratio of at least three-to-one is required
4Costly social sanctions in Public Good games under noisy monitoring have been studied by Grechenig et al.
53 The Experiment
The experiment consists of two phases. The first phase is the core of the experiment. Subjects play
the Liability Game, a game in which legal rules and the enforcement policy change across treatments.
Each round of play involves two stages. In the first stage participants choose their actions and may
or may not be subject to legal sanctions. In the second stage they have the opportunity to informally
sanction other participants. The game is repeated 10 times with nonmonetary punishments and is
followed by a modified version of the same game in which nonmonetary punishments are replaced
by small monetary punishments, also repeated 10 times. Although participants knew that the
experiment was made of several parts, they did not know during the first ten periods that ten
subsequent periods with monetary punishments would follow. Finally, in the second phase, we run
a questionnaire for demographics and additional control variables. Instructions are displayed in the
Appendix.
3.1 Liability Game
Common Set-up. After several control questions, participants are introduced to the Liability
Game with a new set of instructions. They are told that they are going to play a game that will
be repeated 10 times. At each round, participants are randomly and anonymously matched into
groups of 4 participants.
Participants start each round with an initial endowment of 20 ECU. At each round they need
to choose between two actions, Y and X. Action Y yields an income of 6 ECU and does not
affect the other participants’ earnings. Action X yields a state-dependent income and reduces by
4 ECU the earnings of each of the three other participants in the group. While participants are
told about actions X and Y , we shall refer to them as actions Harmful and Harmless respectively
for the remainder of the paper. At the beginning of each round, a random state is drawn for each
participant among four possible states, A, B, C and D, with equal probability (i.e., 25%). States
are independently drawn and are private information throughout the game. The states define a
participant’s circumstances with respect to the private benefit of action Harmful : this action yields
an income of 14 ECU in state A, 16 ECU in state B, 20 ECU in state C, and 22 ECU in state
D. Note that an individual’s circumstances in each period is private information5 known before
choosing which action to undertake and that, at no moment during the experiment, do participants
have a feedback about the income of other players.
Treatments. Participants were subjected to five different treatments defined in terms of the
prevailing liability rule and the enforcement policy. The between-subject treatment variations on
the three liability rules and the two enforcement policies are summarized in Table 1.6
• No Law (NL). In the first treatment, there is no liability rule. Each participant has to bear
the losses caused by the actions Harmful of other participants in the group. A participant’s
net payoff per period, in addition to the endowment at the start of the round, is therefore (i)
the private benefit from one’s own action Harmless or Harmful, (ii) minus the losses caused
by the actions Harmful of other participants.
(2010) and Ambrus and Greiner (2012).
5In the instructions: "The other participants of your group won’t be able to observe your situation (and you won’t
be able to know theirs)". See Instructions 2 in the Appendix.
6We thank a referee for suggesting this table.
6• Severe Strict Liability (SSL). In the second treatment, participants are told they will be
required to compensate the other group members for the losses caused by their decision to
engage in action Harmful. Therefore no one suffers from the other participants’ decision to
engage in Harmful. The net period income equals (i) the private benefit from one’s own action
Harmless or Harmful, (ii) minus the damages (12 ECU) for compensation if action Harmful
was chosen.
• Severe Negligence Rule (SNR). In the third treatment, participants are told they will
be required to compensate for the losses caused by their action Harmful if they are in state
A or B. A participant therefore suffers from the other participants’ actions Harmful only if
these actions were undertaken in the circumstances C or D. The net period income equals (i)
the private benefits from one’s own action Harmless or Harmful, (ii) minus the damages (12
ECU) for compensation if they choose Harmful in state A or B, (iii) minus the losses caused
by the other participants’ decision to engage in Harmful in the circumstances C or D.
• Mild Strict Liability (MSL). The fourth treatment is similar to the second treatment,
except that participants who engage in Harmful are made to compensate only with a prob-
ability equal to 0.5, henceforth the detection or enforcement probability.7 The net period
income equals (i) the private benefit from one’s own action Harmless or Harmful, (ii) minus
the eventual damages (12 ECU) for compensation if they choose Harmful and are detected,
(iii) minus the losses caused by the other participants’ decisions to engage in Harmful that
were not detected.
• Mild Negligence Rule (MNR). The fifth treatment is similar to the third treatment, except
that participants who engage in Harmful in state A or B are made to compensate only with
a probability of one half. The net period income equals (i) the private benefit from one’s own
action Harmless or Harmful, (ii) minus the eventual damages (12 ECU) for compensation if
the participant chooses Harmful in state A or B and is detected, (iii) minus the losses caused
by the other participants’ decision to engage in Harmful when either they were in state C or
D or they were in the states A or B but were not detected.
Framing. Liability rules in the instructions were described in a neutral way to avoid any framing
effects beyond those naturally involved in liability rules.8 Specifically, regarding the description of
the actions’ consequences on others, the instructions were worded as follows:
Action Y affects only your own income. On the contrary, action X negatively affects the
income of the other participants of your group: it generates a loss of 4 ECU to each of
them. Thus, choosing action X will lead to a total loss of 12 ECU for the group (i.e. 4
ECU for each of the three other players).
Regarding the compensation mechanisms, we describe them as a mechanism aiming at compen-
sating damages caused by action Harmful. For instance, for the Severe Negligence Rule, we explain
the compensation rules as follows9:
7Detection was randomly decided by the computer at the individual level.
8Liability rules are aimed at compensating victims of negative externalities. We therefore talked about "compen-
sations". However, we did not influence participants as to whether action Harmful is more or less desirable than
action Harmless. See the discussion in Section 6.
9All instructions can be found in the Appendix.
7Table 1: Overview of the treatment variations
Once all the participants of your group, you included, have decided between action X
and Y, the computer will compute all individual payoffs. Each individual who has caused
damages to others in situations A or B will have to compensate them. Participants who
undertook action X in situations C or D will not compensate for the damages caused.
Nonmonetary punishments and payoffs. At the end of each period, participants learn the
total number of other group members who chose action Harmful. In all treatments but No Law,
participants also know whether each of the other three group members (anonymously identified as
player 1, 2 or 3) had to compensate other participants, i.e., was held “legally liable”. Individual
actions and states of nature are therefore private information except in so far as actions and states
can be inferred from the assignment of liability or from the total number of actions Harmful. This
is the only information obtained about other participants.
After receiving this information and learning their period payoff, participants have the oppor-
tunity to assign disapproval points (between 0 and 6) to each other participant in their group. The
disapproval points are individual. After the assignment of disapproval points, a final screen displays
to each participant the amount of disapproval points the participant received.
More formally, the status of individual i is defined as follows:
liablei =

0 in No Law
HFi in Severe Strict Liability
1A,BHFi in Severe Negligence Rule
1detHFi in Mild Strict Liability
1det1A,BHFi in Mild Negligence Rule
where HF is a dummy variable equal to 1 if action Harmful is undertaken, 1A,B is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if individual i is in state A or B and equal to 0 otherwise; 1det is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if individual i is detected after engaging in action Harmful, and is 0 otherwise.
Monetary punishments and payoffs. After the ten rounds of the Liability Game with
disapproval points, participants are given a new set of instructions and learn that they will play
8another 10 rounds of the previous game. The only change compared to the 10 previous rounds is
that disapproval points are replaced by costly sanction points.10 Participants have the opportunity
to impose sanction points on other group members. Each point decreases both the participant’s
and the target’s payoff by 0.5 ECU.11 Each participant can assign up to 6 sanction points to each
group member.
3.2 Control Questions.
Before playing the game, participants were asked a series of questions to ensure that the game was
well understood. We generated a mock stage game in which we displayed the actions, situations
and liability status of a virtual group of participants. Control questions were designed to address
all the mechanisms that affect the period payoffs. Participants had to fill in, step by step, a table
which required to compute the losses each participant imposed and bore, the compensation each of
them gave and received, and their final payoff.
3.3 Questionnaire
After completion of the Liability Game, participants are asked to fill out a questionnaire on demo-
graphics (age, gender) and on preferences and self-perception. These include (i) self-declared politi-
cal orientation, (ii) attitude with respect to state intervention in the economy, (iii) self-assessed risk
aversion, (iv) the extent to which they see themselves as selfish, (v) how much they think others see
them as selfish, (vi) the extent to which they feel concerned about the well-being of others, (vii) how
much they think others see them as being concerned by the well-being of others. For cross-study
comparison purposes, the last four questions were adapted from Angelova et al. (2014).12
3.4 Sessions.
The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). We ran 10 sessions (two per
treatment) in May, July and September 2016 in Québec (Canada) and Strasbourg (France).13 Each
session included 20 participants, amounting to five groups of four subjects at each round, except
for one No Law session that included only 16 participants. Overall, 196 participants took part in
the experiment. An ECU was convertible to Canadian dollars at 30 ECU = 1 dollar or to Euros
at 40 ECU = 1 Euro. The same co-author supervised all sessions. All participants in Strasbourg
were recruited by ORSEE (Greiner (2015)) and by a similar software developed by Laval University
in Québec. Participants earned on average 19.15 Euros and the sessions lasted between 75 and 90
minutes.
10The within-subject treatment variation regarding the monetary cost of sanctions is kept constant for all liability
rules and enforcement policies. Our goal is not to explore the impact of sanctions per se, but to capture social norms
by measuring how subjects respond to the same type of sanction under different liability rules.
11Given the one-to-one ratio between the cost to the punished and the punisher, informal sanctions do not change
relative payoffs. This eliminates the possibility that informal sanctions are driven by aversion to disadvantageous
inequality. As noted earlier, a high impact-low cost ratio is needed to sustain cooperation in public good games; see
footnote 3.
12In this experiment, we use non-incentivized elicitations of preferences regarding risk-aversion and concerns for
others, as in Angelova et al. (2014). While non-incentivized elicitations can have some benefits (Lönnqvist et al.,
2015), other experimental works take the advantage of the laboratory to use incentivized elicitation methods (e.g.,
Eisenberg and Engel, 2016).
13We ran 3 sessions in Québec (1 SSL, 1 SNR, 1 NL), and all remaining sessions in Strasbourg. All regression
results presented in the paper hold if we include a dummy variable that accounts for the location of the session.
94 Models and Predictions
Socially efficient behavior, in the sense of maximizing total group wealth, is for action Harmless to
be chosen in the circumstances A or B and action Harmful in the circumstances C or D. How-
ever, with purely self-interested agents, action Harmful is strictly dominant under No Law in all
circumstances.14 Under Mild Law, the same is true for a risk neutral under both legal regimes, but
in circumstances A and B a sufficiently risk averse might choose action Harmless to avoid bearing
risk. Nevertheless, given the initial endowments and the probability of detection, only an extremely
risk averse would do so. For example, with the Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function,
an individual in the circumstance A will choose Harmful if his coefficient of relative risk aversion
is below 3.5. A coefficient above this threshold is outside the normal range in laboratory experi-
ments, where relative risk aversion coefficients are often estimated to be between 0.5 and 1.5 (see
for instance Holt and Laury 2002). We conclude that our Mild Law is non-deterrent except possibly
for unreasonably risk averse individuals. In what follows, for the case of imperfect enforcement,
expected values are taken as an acceptable approximation of certainty equivalents.15
Prediction 1 Under No Law or under Mild Law, purely self-interested agents choose the action
Harmful in all circumstances. Under Severe Law, in either legal regimes, they choose the action
Harmless in the circumstances A or B and the action Harmful in the circumstances C or D.
The experimental literature suggests some departure from pure self-interest. This has been
analyzed mostly in terms of interpersonal comparisons or efficiency concerns. We discuss the impli-
cations of some well-known formulations.
Inequality aversion. In Fehr and Schmidt’s canonical model of social preferences, individuals
have a utility function of the form:
ui = pii − αi
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max{pij − pii, 0} − βi
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max{pii − pij , 0}
where pii is individual i’s total payoff16, n is the number of individuals in the group, and αi and βi
are the so-called envy and empathy (or guilt) parameters respectively, with 0 ≤ βi ≤ αi and βi < 1.
In many PG games, the above utility function has been shown to be consistent with an efficient
outcome (among multiple Nash equilibria), provided all individuals have sufficiently large empathy.17
This arises in particular because the efficient outcome is characterized by equal payoffs. This is not
so in our set-up: efficient behavior is most likely to yield unequal payoffs, irrespective of the legal
regime. Because envy is a stronger driver than empathy, inequality aversion is not conducive to
efficient behavior. We only give the informal argument. Consider the No Law regime. Suppose
individual i expects others to behave efficiently and finds himself in the circumstance A. The
probability that at least one of the three other players is in the circumstances C or D equals
1 − .53 = 0.875. This is also the probability that at least one of the other three players, behaving
efficiently, will choose the action Harmful, thereby inflicting harm on i and providing for himself a
large payoff. In other words, individual i will most surely be behind. Therefore, in the circumstance
14Proceeding by backward induction, the equilibrium prediction is that of a one-shot game at each period of play.
15In the subsequent analysis, we rejected the hypothesis that the certainty equivalent significantly differs from the
expected value.
16This is the total payoff as defined in Section 3.1. It therefore depends on the individual’s action and circumstances,
on the actions of others, and on the legal regime.
17See the elaborate discussion in Markussen et al. (2014), in particular their online appendix.
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A, he will not be motivated by empathy (but rather by envy) and he will choose the socially
inefficient action Harmful. In turn, if an individual expects others to always choose Harmful, he
will himself do the same in all circumstances.18
The same argument applies under Mild Law, given the enforcement probability of one half and
our calibration of payoffs. By contrast, and as expected, efficient behavior is a Nash equilibrium
under Strong Law. Thus, in our set-up, inequality aversion yields the same predictions about the
possibility of efficient behavior as would standard self-interested preferences. A similar argument
applies with other models of inequality aversion, such as Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
Altruism and efficiency concerns. The main concurrent approach views departures from
pure self-interest as motivated by altruism or a concern for efficiency. Borrowing from Charness and
Rabin (2002) and others19, let individuals have a utility function of the form:
ui = (1− λi)pii + λi
∑
j
pij (1)
where λi ∈ [0, 1] is the weight the individual puts on social efficiency as measured by the total group
payoff, including that of individual i. Note that (1) is equivalent to
ui = pii + λi
∑
j 6=i
pij .
Individual i’s utility is always increasing in his own payoff and is never decreasing in the total payoff
of other participants. If all individuals have λi equal to zero, preferences reduce to pure self-interest.
An individual with a positive λi is willing to sacrifice some private payoff provided this increases
sufficiently the total group payoff, including his own.20
Due to the linearity of (1), the equilibrium is in dominant strategies: one’s best response is
independent of the (expected) actions of others and the losses these may cause. Denote by gp the
private benefit from individual i’s action, net of the legal damages he may be required to pay.
Denote by gs the effect on the total group payoff, including individual i. The private gain from
action Harmless is y, that of action Harmful is x, which depends on circumstances, and the external
harm this action causes is h. Therefore, for action Harmless, gp = gs = y. For action Harmful, in
expected value, gp = x− ph and gs = x− h where p is the probability of having to compensate the
harm. Depending on circumstances, the legal regime and the enforcement policy, p is either zero,
one half or unity.
Let us denote with capital letters the net private and social consequences of action Harmful
compared to action Harmless:
Gp = x− y − ph, Gs = x− y − h.
Then, in the Nash equilibrium, individual i chooses Harmful if
∆ui = (1− λi)Gp + λiGs (2)
18There may be another equilibrium. If all individuals have βi > 2/3, then there is an equilibrium where all
individuals always choose Harmless. However, such a degree of aversion to advantageous inequality is inconsistent
with results found elsewhere; see for instance Bellemare et al. (2008).
19See Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), Engelman and Strobel (2004), Charness et al. (2016)
20Such an individual is altruistic in the sense that he values others’ payoffs, but not to the point of redistributing
his own wealth as this would not change the total group payoff.
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is positive. The utility differential can be rewritten as
∆ui = Gp − λi(Gp −Gs)
where Gp − Gs = (1 − p)h is the expected uncompensated harm imposed on others. Thus, the
social concern parameter λi can be interpreted as the rate at which the individual trades off his own
private benefit net of legal sanctions against the uncompensated loss caused to third parties. Note
that Gp ≥ Gs.
If action Harmful is socially efficient, i.e., Gs > 0, then (2) is positive and action Harmful is
chosen irrespective of the value of λi, the legal regime and the enforcement policy. If action Harmful
is socially inefficient, i.e., Gs < 0, and the law perfectly internalizes the harm, i.e., Gp = Gs, then (2)
is negative and action Harmless is chosen. It follows that the social concern parameter λi matters
only in circumstances where self and group interest conflicts (i.e., Gp > 0 and Gs < 0) and liability
rules are imperfectly enforced or non existent.
Whether social concern then makes a difference depends on the size of λi and the choices facing
the individual. In the circumstances A or B, an individual with a sufficiently large λi will choose
action Harmless even under No Law. In the same circumstances, an individual with a smaller λi
may choose Harmful under No Law but Harmless under nondeterrent Mild Law, because the private
gain Gp net of legal liability is now smaller while the social gain Gs is unaffected. Also, under No
Law or under Mild Law, an individual who would have chosen Harmless in the circumstance A may
well choose Harmful in the circumstance B because both Gp and Gs are increasing in the gross
benefit x from action Harmful.
Prediction 2 When agents are efficiency concerned, (i) in the circumstances A or B, the propor-
tion of agents choosing Harmful may decrease from No Law to Mild Law; (ii) under No Law or Mild
Law the proportion of agents choosing Harmful may increase from circumstance A to circumstance
B; (iii) in the circumstances C or D, all agents choose Harmful irrespective of the legal regime.
Reciprocity, normative effects of obligations, and other considerations. Other things
equal, some individuals may strictly prefer not to cause harm. In particular, when both actions are
equally efficient, i.e., Gs = 0, and the legal system perfectly internalizes the harm caused to others,
i.e., Gp = Gs, some individuals may strictly prefer action Harmless. This modifies the expression
in (2) to
∆ui = (1− λi)Gp + λiGs + δi
where δi ≤ 0 captures a willingness to avoid action Harmful and reflects a variety of motivations
other than related to private and social gains, e.g., a pure reluctance to cause harm or the disutility
from social disapproval when one is found (or is believed) to have caused harm.21 In Section 5.2,
δi is replaced by βXi where β is a vector of coefficients and Xi is a vector of variables, including
socio-demographic variables and occurrences during the game such as disapproval points received.
An individual with a sufficiently negative δi = βXi could refrain from the action Harmful even
when it is the socially efficient action.
Reciprocity refers to the possibility that the weight an agent puts on others’ payoffs depends on
the perceived social concern of others. For instance, λi = 0 when others misbehave while λi = λ∗ > 0
21The latter relates to the incentivizing role of social or self-esteem concerns, as in Bénabou and Tirole (2006,
2011); see also Deffains and Fluet (2013) for an application to liability rules in the accident model.
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when others behave well.22 Under No Law, reciprocity raises the possibility of multiple equilibria
ranked in terms of the extent of socially efficient behavior.23
As discussed in Section 2, the literature on public good games with nondeterrent legal obliga-
tions has emphasized that obligations may affect expectations and help coordinate on the better
equilibria. Another possibility is that obligations directly modify preferences through moral sua-
sion, irrespective of sanctions and expectations.24 We capture such effects by regime dependent
coefficients. The expression in (2) is modified to
∆ui = (1− λir)Gp + λirGs + δir (3)
where the legal regime is denoted by r and is either No Law (NL), strict liability (SL) or the
negligence rule (NR).
If legal liability crowds in social concerns, the λir’s will be at least as large under SL or NR as
under NL. In the circumstances A and B, a change from No Law to Mild Law then reduces the
proportion of individuals choosing Harmful in two ways: first, the private material benefit of action
Harmful is reduced because of the expected liability cost; secondly, the law may reinforce social
concerns.
Prediction 3 Under strict liability or the negligence rule, individuals are at least as much con-
cerned about the net uncompensated losses caused to others as under No Law.
Disapproval behavior. In PG games or prisoners’ dilemma experiments, abstracting from
revenge punishments, informal sanctions target those who behave badly, i.e., do not contribute or
defect (e.g., Falk et al., 2005). This is consistent with the role of indignation in social sanctioning
behavior (e.g., Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009; Carpenter and Matthews, 2012). The analogue in our
set-up, if individuals value efficiency concerns, would be for informal sanctions to target those who
are thought to behave inefficiently.
If others are expected to be motivated by self-interest and possibly also by some degree of
efficiency concerns, it should be inferred that those who did not cause harm behaved efficiently.
A participant observes the number of actions Harmful among the three other participants and he
observes who has been held liable, an identification effect. From these two pieces of information,
a participant derives the probability that any of the other participant engaged in action Harmful.
Under No Law or Mild Law, one who causes harm is more likely to have behaved inefficiently,
hence disapproval (or sanction) points assigned to other participants should be increasing in the
probability that they caused harm. In addition, under the negligence rule, liability reveals for sure
that behavior was inefficient. More generally, informal sanctions may depend on the perceived
prevalence of inefficient behavior.
Prediction 4 Disapproval is targeted at those who are perceived to inefficiently cause harm.
22This is in line with the simple model of reciprocity in Section II of Charness and Rabin (2002).
23Segal and Sobel (2007) assume that individuals have preferences over the strategies of others rather than only
over outcomes. An individual’s preferences can then be represented as a linear combination of all the agents’ utility
functions over outcomes, where the weights depend on the equilibrium strategies. This is consistent with the decision
function in (2) where the individuals’ λi are obtained at equilibrium.
24See Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2014). Galbiati and Vertova (2014) find that both channels are at play.
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5 Results
To explore the results of our experiment, we proceed as follows. First, we discuss the overall
efficiency of each liability system. Second, we test the explanatory power of a simplified version
of the theoretical model proposed in section 4. The goal is to assess how much the individuals’
decisions can be explained in a framework combining only self-interest and social efficiency concerns
together with a pure reluctance term. Next we take into account the socio-demographic variables
and additional factors that may impact the decision to undertake the action Harmful. This may
be interpreted as disaggregating the reluctance term. Finally, we explore the decisions to impose
social sanctions on other participants.
5.1 Efficiency of liability rules
Figure 1 displays the proportion of actions Harmful undertaken in each of the four possible circum-
stances under every legal regime. Clearly the presence of a legal system and the extent to which it
is enforced greatly impact decisions when self and group interests conflict, i.e., in the circumstances
A and B. In these circumstances, the proportion of actions Harmful is greatest under No Law
(88.2% and 96.9% under circumstances A and B respectively) and reaches the smallest level under
Severe Law, both under strict liability (9.5% and 18.3% under circumstances A and B respectively)
and under the negligence rule (15.0% and 15.0% under circumstances A and B respectively). Pro-
portion tests and multivariate analyses25 confirm that individuals are more likely to undertake the
Harmful action in circumstances A and B in No Law, than in Severe Strict Liability (p < 0.001
for circumstances A and B) or in Severe Negligence Rule (p < 0.001 for circumstances A and B).
Thus, it seems that a perfectly enforced legal system successfully achieves its main objective.
Result 1 The introduction of a priori deterrent perfectly enforced liability rule significantly re-
duces the proportion of harmful welfare-decreasing actions.
However, the data also partially contradict the theoretical predictions based on purely self-
interested preferences. First, in the circumstances A or B, there is a significantly smaller proportion
of actions Harmful under Mild Law than in No Law, for both the strict liability (41.8% and 63.9%
under circumstances A and B respectively) and the negligence rule (54.3% and 75.2% under circum-
stances A and B respectively). In these cases, it is privately inefficient to undertake Harmless but
almost half of the participants choose to do so. Proportion tests and multivariate analyses reject the
equality of behaviors under circumstances A and B for No Law compared to Mild Strict Liability
(p < 0.001 for circumstances A and B) and Mild Negligence Rule (p < 0.001 for circumstances A
and B).
Result 2 The introduction of a priori non-deterrent imperfectly enforced liability rule significantly
reduces the proportion of welfare-decreasing actions.
Moreover, the proportion of actions Harmful increases with the circumstances: more participants
tend to undertake Harmful in situation B compared with A or in situation D compared with C,
although standard preferences would predict similar choices.
25We estimated a random effect probit model that include all control variables presented in section 3.3. Standard
errors were clustered at the session level. We report the p-values of the coefficient associated with the treatment
dummy variable. Results are available on demand.
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So far, the results are consistent with Prediction 2. In addition, we also observe that, under
Mild Law, strict liability yields a smaller proportion of actions Harmful than the negligence rule
in the circumstances A and B. Indeed, 41.8% (resp. 63.9%) of the participants choose the action
Harmful in circumstance A (resp. B) in Mild Strict Liability, compared to 54.3% (resp. 75.2%) for
Mild Negligence Rule. These differences are statistically significant in a proportion test (p = 0.015
and p = 0.014 for circumstances A and B respectively) and in multivariate analyses (p < 0.001 and
p = 0.012).
Result 3 When legal rules are imperfectly enforced, strict liability is more likely to deter harmful
welfare-decreasing actions than the negligence rule.
Finally, we further observe that both under Mild and Severe Law, strict liability also yields a
smaller proportion of actions Harmful in the circumstances C and D. In these circumstances, it
is both privately and socially optimal to choose Harmful. In Severe Law, participants under strict
liability undertake the action Harmful 83.2% of the time in circumstance C (resp. 91.3% in cir-
cumstance D), against 94.0% for participants who play under the negligence rule (resp. 97.0% in
circumstance D). These differences are statistically significant in proportion tests (p < 0.001 and
p = 0.0158 for circumstances C and D respectively) and in multivariate analyses (p = 0.010 and
p < 0.001). In Mild law, we observe a similar pattern: 83.7% participants facing strict liability in
circumstance C choose the Harmful action (resp. 96.8% in circumstance D), against 99.1% for par-
ticipants facing the negligence rule (resp. 98.9% in circumstance D). The difference is statistically
significant for circumstance C in proportion tests (p < 0.001 and p = 0.169 for circumstances C
and D respectively) and for both circumstances in multivariate analyses (p < 0.001 and p < 0.001).
Result 4 When legal rules are imperfectly or perfectly enforced, strict liability is more likely to
deter harmful welfare-increasing actions than the negligence rule.
5.2 Social concerns and private interests
We next turn to a simple approach for understanding the data on the basis of the model devel-
oped in Section 4. The next section will build on this preliminary analysis, integrating additional
econometric considerations. For simplicity, we assume that all participants share the same fixed set
of preferences except for an additive noise term in maximizing utility. This term crudely captures
preference heterogeneity among participants. We fit the logistic regression
P =
eγ∆u
1 + eγ∆u
(4)
where P is the probability of undertaking action Harmful, ∆u is the difference in utility between the
actions Harmful and Harmless as defined in (3), and γ is the parameter capturing the sensitivity
of behavior to differences in utility as defined in the model. The size of γ reflects the explanatory
power of the model. Thus, we estimate a binary-response logit with the propensity score
γ [(1− λr)Gp + λrGs + δ] , r ∈ {NL,SL,NR}
Table 5 shows the regression results for a variety of restrictions on the parameter values. In
Model 1, all parameters are constrained to equal zero except γ. This specification corresponds to
purely self-interested preferences, i.e., the propensity score in the logit is γGp. In Model 2, we allow
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for social concerns with a parameter that does not depend on the legal regime. The parameter is
highly significant and the log-likelihood improves markedly. Individuals put non-negligible weight
on the group payoff in addition to their own private benefit. In Model 3, we allow the constant term
to differ from zero. The term has the expected sign indicating a reluctance to choose action Harmful
everything else equal, but the gain in explanatory power is slight and the average willingness to pay
to avoid action Harmful is very small (0.27 ECU).
In the last three models, we allow the social concern parameter to differ between legal regimes.
The major gain here is with respect to the value of the parameter under strict liability. In Model 4a,
λSL may differ from λNL = λNR. The difference is highly significant. Individuals put greater weight
on others’ payoff under strict liability compared with No Law and the negligence rule. Model 4b does
the same with respect to λNR but this is much less successful. Finally, in Model 5, all restrictions
are removed. The social concern parameters are quantitatively important in all legal regimes and
they differ significantly between regimes. In this more flexible model, the reluctance parameter δ
essentially vanishes. Figure 2 illustrates the predictions of the model.26 To summarize, we have the
following results, which are consistent with Prediction 3.
Result 5 Individuals care about others’ payoff. In the absence of legal obligations, there is a
trade-off rate of 28% between private benefits and the losses imposed on others.
Result 6 Legal rules crowd in social concerns. The trade-off rate between the net private benefits
and the net uncompensated losses imposed on others increases to 37% under the negligence rule
and to 50% under the strict liability rule.
5.3 Determinants of action Harmful
The model of Section 4 explains a great deal of the data. About 43% of the individual decisions27
are explained by expected private benefits net of legal liability, the effect on group payoff, and the
impact of legal rules on the social concerns coefficient. We now consider further refinements. We
exploit the repeated choices of each individual by adding individual effects. In addition, we include
the control variables of the questionnaire and also consider the impact of social disapproval and
informal costly sanctions on the decision to undertake Harmful.
In the Tables 628 and 7, the decisions to choose Harmful over Harmless are analyzed by logistic
regression with individual random effects and clustered at the session level.29 The variable G is
defined as G = Gs − Gp, i.e., it is the expected uncompensated loss imposed on others expressed
as a negative value. In the regression of Table 6, the social concern variable is constrained to be
the same in all legal regimes. For simplicity, the estimated coefficients are presented in their raw
form. For comparison with Table 5, the coefficient of Gp should be read as β1 = γ; the coefficient
of G should be read as β2 = γλ. Hence the social concern parameter is computed as λ = β2/β1. In
Table 7, the social concern parameter is allowed to differ between legal regimes, so the coefficient
of G is interacted with a regime specific dummy variable.30
26Allowing δ to differ between legal rules was not significant. We also tested for the role of risk aversion under
imperfect enforcement with dummy variables subtracted from the expected private gain. This was also not significant.
27On the basis of the Pseudo R2
28Note that the results hold if we exclude the 10th and the 20th periods.
29We cluster data at the session level to take into account the potential dynamic session effects. See Fréchette
(2012).
30Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al. (2004) discuss the difficulty of directly interpreting interaction terms in
non-linear models. This difficulty originates from the fact that two variables changes at the same time. Here, our
specification does not include treatment effects, which allows us to interpret the coefficients directly. Given that, we
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As in the previous section, the participants’ behavior is partly explained by a concern for the
net uncompensated losses they can impose on others. In Table 6, the estimated coefficient of the
net loss variable G is significant in all specifications. Depending on the specification, the value
of the implied social concern parameter λ varies between 0.37 and 0.39 (in the columns 2a to 5a)
which is very close to the value estimated in Model 3 of Table 5. When we allow the coefficient to
differ between legal regimes as in Table 7, we again obtain that the social concern parameter in the
presence of liability rules is substantially larger than under No Law. The parameter is around 0.25
under No Law, 0.53 under the negligence rule and 0.57 under strict liability. The difference between
strict liability and the negligence rule is no longer significant.
Our experiment allows participants to express disapproval of their fellow participants at the end
of each round. Social sanctions have been showed to influence behavior in public good experiments.
Our results suggest that individuals are indeed less likely to undertake Harmful when they have
received nonmonetary punishment points at the previous round. This effect is more pronounced
with monetary punishment points. The behavioral impact of social sanctions occurs mainly in
situations where individuals were disapproved of after undertaking Harmful, whereas disapproval
following action Harmless does not affect subsequent decisions.31 Last, the proportion of Harmful
actions by other participants in the past history of the game does not seem to affect one’s decision to
undertake action Harmful. Note also that there is clearly much heterogeneity between individuals.
Everything else equal, those who have chosen action Harmful in the past are also significantly more
likely to do so in the future.
Result 7 Individuals are less likely to reiterate a harmful action when they have been disapproved
of or informally sanctioned at the previous period in situations where they have engaged in the
harmful action.
5.4 Determinants of social sanctions
Our main objective for introducing social sanctions, which we now deal with, is to identify the
determinants of disapproval as a reflection of the underlying social norms. Because our groups
are rematched after each round, disapproval can only be expressed about essentially anonymous
persons, e.g., those who have been found liable or who are believed to have caused harm.
Participants largely took advantage of the possibility to express disapproval. Individuals received
on average 4 to 8 nonmonetary punishment points per round depending on the treatment. Costly
sanctions are assigned less often, i.e., they are sensitive to the cost of punishment. When a legal
regime is in force, nonmonetary punishment appears to be mainly concentrated on participants who
were held liable, except under the negligence rule under Mild Law; see Figure 3. By contrast, with
costly sanctions, there is no difference between liable and not liable under strict liability, whether
Mild or Severe, while the difference is significant under the Severe negligence rule and somewhat so
under the Mild negligence rule; see Figure 4. The latter result (but not that Figure 3) is roughly
consistent with Prediction 4. Also, there is much disapproval of individuals who have not been held
liable. Under No Law, no one is ever held liable but participants received on average 8 disapproval
points per round, which is also consistent with Prediction 4.
computed the marginal effects associated with the regressions of table 7 and found similar results to what is presented
below. Note that, if we exclude individual effects, we still observe statistically different effects of G between SL and
NL, but the significance decreases for NR vs. NL.
31Note that including past behaviors in the regression can create endogeneity issues. Correcting endogeneity using
Arellano-bond like correction would require GMM estimations, which do not allow for logistic regressions with random
individual effects and clustering at the session level (Stata package melogit). Following the literature on Public Good
Contribution, we prefer to correct for individual heterogeneity and clustering.
17
We ran a series of regressions on the decision of individual i to punish the other participants
in his group at round t. Recall that, at the end of each round, participant i observes whether
participant j was held liable and he also observes the total number of actions Harmful for which
individuals were not held liable. From the latter, participant i can infer the probability that a
non liable participant j undertook the harmful action. This inference does not depend on the legal
regime and in some cases the up-dated probability may very well equal unity. This allows us to
disentangle two effects: (i) how one’s belief that j engaged in Harmful affects one’s disapproval of
j; (ii) the effect of liability per se, in addition to its role in revealing that j engaged in Harmful.
The results are displayed in Table 8. The coefficient of the explanatory variable liablej is the
number of punishment points assigned on average to a participant who has been found liable.
The variable (1 − liablej)pHF is the probability that a non liable participant j engaged in action
Harmful. Its estimated coefficient can therefore be interpreted as the number of punishment points
assigned to a non liable participant who is believed to have engaged in Harmful for sure, i.e., when
(1− liablej)pHF equals unity. Overall the difference between the coefficients of the two variables is
small or not significant. There is no significant effect of liability per se in addition to its informational
role.
Engaging in action Harmful does not necessarily imply socially inefficient behavior. The same
observation holds with respect to legal liability, except under the negligence rule. We further inquired
whether there is additional disapproval of a participant who may be believed to have inefficiently
engaged in Harmful, whether the participant was found liable or not. The variable pHF_AB
captures participant i’s belief that participant j engaged in Harmful in the circumstances A or B.
The aim is now to disentangle between disapproval of individuals who are believed to have caused
harm and of those who are believed to have caused harm inefficiently.32 The coefficient of pHF_AB
has the predicted sign but is not significant. We conclude that there is no evidence that efficiency
concerns constitute a strong determinant of disapproval.
Finally, a tendency for “blind revenge ” with respect to nonmonetary punishment points is also
observed. Participants are more likely to sanction other participants the more they have been
sanctioned themselves at the previous round. The effect is significant but quantitatively small and
is non existent when social sanctions are costly. Although “blind revenge ” is more likely to occur
when an individual was disapproved of after undertaking Harmless as opposed to Harmful, the
difference is not statistically significant.
Result 8 The main driver of social disapproval is the belief that a participant has engaged in the
harmful action, whether or not the participant was held legally liable and irrespective of whether
behavior was believed to be inefficient.
6 Discussion
Framing effects in Public Good games have been extensively discussed. For instance, subjects
contribute more when the positive externality of contributing to the public good is stressed rather
32The variable pHF_AB is the probability that a participant undertook action Harmful in situation A or B. It is
the probability of the joint events Harmful and AB. We compute it as the product of the probability that an individual
undertook Harmful and the conditional probability that an individual undertook action Harmful in situation A or B
given that he undertook action Harmful. For treatments SSL, MSL and NL, the conditional probability equals the
ratio of the number of actions Harmful undertaken in A or B over the total number of actions Harmful undertaken
in the treatment, i.e. the empirical frequency. In SNR, it is equal to 1 if the individual is liable, and to 0 if he is not
liable. Under MNR, the variable equals 1 if the individual is liable and equals the empirical frequency if he is not
liable.
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than the negative externality of not contributing (e.g., Andreoni, 1995; Park, 2000). In a review
paper, Cartwright (2016) remarks that positive-negative framing should be distinguished from give-
take framing, i.e., whether subjects are asked to contribute to a public good or take from a public
resource. He also suggests a third dimension related to how the participants’ initial allocation is
presented.
By their very nature, liability rules involve some degree of framing. This is because they posit
a reference point equal to the individual’s endowment (an entitlement) and with respect to which
compensable losses are defined. Under No Law, the instructions to the participants specified en-
dowments, the private benefits from possible actions, and the fact that some actions caused losses
to others and that one could suffer losses due to the actions of others. When legal liability was
introduced, it was described as the obligation to compensate the losses caused to others, possibly
only in some circumstances. In Cartwright’s typology, our instructions can therefore be described
as a negative-take-endowment framing. Obviously the consequences of one’s actions could have
been presented differently. However, because our goal is to assess the behavioral impact of liability
rules, our framing of consequences is part to the very effect we aim at capturing. It should be
stressed that at no point did the instructions suggest to participants that they should refrain from
the action Harmful. Consistent with the legal notion of liability rules, the message only concerned
the obligation to compensate and in what circumstances.
We also analyzed the determinants of social disapproval as an expression of underlying social
norms.33 Participants unambiguously express disapproval of individuals who cause losses, whether in
No Law or when an obligation to compensate is conveyed. In the treatments with Law, those actually
found liable face somewhat greater disapproval but the difference is barely significant. Also, whether
the action causing harm is socially efficient does not seem to matter in the expression of disapproval.
This can be read directly from the Figures 5 and 6. When liability rules are perfectly enforced,
most individuals behave efficiently in terms of the overall group income. Under strict liability,
individuals found liable therefore most likely behaved efficiently, i.e., they must have chosen the
harm causing action only in the circumstances C or D. These individuals should face no disapproval
if participants primarily disapproved of actions that inefficiently cause harm.34 However, individuals
found liable under strict liability receive on average the same number of disapproval points as those
found liable under the negligence rule, who for sure behaved inefficiently. Moreover, whether harm
was compensated or not has no effect either on the expression of disapproval. Individuals found
liable under the perfectly enforced strict liability rule face roughly the same disapproval level as
the average individual under No Law, who most likely has caused harm but without compensating.
Finally, individuals react (at least slightly) to disapproval received but only after choosing the action
causing harm. Presumably this is when they feel disapproval was ‘justified’. In our experiment, bad
behavior seems to be equated to causing losses to others. The finding that subjects punish others
who cause damage, whether this is social welfare enhancing or decreasing, has also been found
in other experiments; see for instance Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron (2009) for the case of breach of
contract. Causing damage albeit for higher personal gain is not something people seem to endorse.35
We posited a utility function with social welfare concerns augmented with additional consid-
33Our definition of social norms is the usual one “as behavioral standards based on socially shared beliefs about
how individuals ought to behave in a given situation ” (Harris et al, 2015, p. 292; see also Bernhard et al. 2006a,b).
34This is also the prediction in Deffains and Fluet (2013) in a model where heterogeneous individuals earn social
esteem when they are thought to trade-off appropriately private benefits and losses to others. Under perfectly enforced
strict liability, everyone behaves the same, hence being found liable is not stigmatizing.
35It may also be remarked that, in our experiment, one may choose to cause harm in order to increase one’s private
benefit, not to avoid a private loss. Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron (2009) remark that individuals are more prone to
sanction tortfeasors when harmful actions are motivated by cupidity rather than loss avoidance.
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erations. Our set-up, however, is one-sided: individuals can benefit the group only by sacrificing
private benefits in order to avoid causing losses. The social concern parameter is therefore best
interpreted as the rate at which individuals trade-off private benefits against losses imposed on
others, i.e., individuals would perhaps not be driven by the same parameter if sacrificing private
benefits increased the wealth of others. We allowed for the possibility that ‘observed’ coefficients
be equilibrium-dependent and in particular that they differ between legal regimes. We also allowed
for a reluctance to undertake the action causing harm, unrelated to the trade-off between private
benefits and losses to others. Reluctance as defined here acts as a fixed cost of engaging in the
harmful action. In the complete analysis, it also captures the threat of social disapproval. Both
social efficiency concerns and reluctance seem to be at work and may explain why under strict
liability, with either Mild or Severe Law, some individuals refrain from the harmful action even
when it is desirable from a collective point of view. The risk of legal sanctions combined with other
motivations then yields some overdeterrence.
7 Conclusion
An extensive theoretical literature has discussed the merits of strict liability and fault-based legal
systems in deterring behavior that generates negative externalities. This body of research concludes
that both types of rules, when perfectly enforced, achieve efficiency by aligning self-interest on
collective interest.
We designed an experiment to investigate how agents behave with or without liability rules
and when rules are weakly enforced. Our set-up is related to PG games in which participants are
randomly matched with strangers and where private and group interests potentially conflict. In our
setting, participants must decide between two actions, one of which generate negative externalities.
In principle the legal rules considered completely align private and group interests but they are
insufficiently deterrent when poorly enforced.
Our paper compares theoretically equivalent liability rules (strict liability and negligence) when
enforcement is not perfect and when engaging in a harm causing action may either increase or
decrease welfare. In a broader sense, this relates to the literature on welfare-enhancing and welfare-
reducing corruption. For example, Cameron et al. (2009) investigate whether individuals’ tendency
to engage in and punish corrupt behaviour is different when the payoff loss to society is greater than
the private benefits to the bribers. Our findings can contribute to improve the economic models of
tort law by showing that apparently equivalent liability rules do not in fact achieve the same levels
of efficiency.
The participants’ behavior contradicts the predictions under standard self-interested preferences.
First, the evidence suggests that individuals are willing to trade-off private gains against the losses
imposed on others. Second, our experiment reveals that the weight given to social concerns relative
to private benefits is increased by the introduction of liability rules. This effect is net of or in
addition to the expected formal sanction introduced by legal liability, when nondeterrent, or of
the fact that legal liability facilitates informal sanctions by making harmful actions attributable.
We do not investigate the precise channel through which the effect operates, e.g., whether it is
through changed expectations triggering conditional cooperation or through pure norm activation.
We find weak evidence that the effect is stronger under strict liability than under the negligence rule.
Compared with the negligence rule, the obligation under strict liability perhaps appears unequivocal
and more equitable: in principle at least, one is always “responsible” for the harm caused to others.
By comparison with the extant literature, our paper clarifies the conditions under which law
could induce compliance by norm activation (and not by deterrence). Among others, Tyran and Feld
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(2006) use a PG game to explain that compliance results from a “democratic dividend” phenomenon.
On the contrary, our paper shows that the norm activation process may arise even when the law
is exogenously imposed. In our experiment, norm activation appears to be related to the design of
the liability rules. We think this result is important to analyze the role of expressive law, i.e., the
normative effects of legal obligations (Galbiati and Vertova, 2008, 2014 ; Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2014).
These effects presumably depend on the meaning of liability rules.
A further contribution of our paper consists in analyzing the determinants of social disapproval
in this setting. As expected, participants are indeed somewhat less likely to engage in harmful
conduct when they have caused harm and have been informally sanctioned by other group members.
In particular, we find that individuals tend to disapprove of other group members who have or may
be believed to have engaged in actions generating negative externalities, irrespective of legal liability
or of socially inefficient behavior. Causing harm rather than harm combined with socially inefficient
behavior is the main driver of social disapproval. A possible interpretation of our findings is that
strict liability, by contrast with the negligence rule, is more in tune with the underlying social norm.
Our results are potentially useful for policy makers. To consider an example, under Mild Law,
we observe that strict liability yields more deterrence than the negligence rule in circumstances
where causing harm is socially inefficient (i.e., the circumstances A and B in our setting). Suppose
for instance that such circumstances occur 85% of the time. The possibility that strict liability over-
deters in the remaining 15% of circumstances (where causing harm is socially efficient) may then
be largely offset by greater deterrence in the most frequent circumstances. This observation can
therefore help in identifying situations where strict liability should be preferred to simple negligence.
A variant of our analysis would be to consider the above Liability Game without informal
sanctions, as in Eisenberg and Engel’s (2014) main analysis. These authors obtain results similar
to that in our paper, but in a setting closer to the canonical linear PG Game. By contrast, our
framework is closer to the usual setting where real life liability rules operate, i.e., a setting with
well defined initial endowments and with losses defined accordingly. Discarding informal sanctions
may be viewed as allowing an evaluation of the “pure” effect of (imperfectly enforced) legal liability,
i.e., independently of the effect of informal sanctions. However, one may also consider that social
disapproval of misconduct is always potentially at work in the background even when formal liability
is nonexistent, albeit only in a diffuse form because wrongdoers cannot be identified. An essential
feature of legal liability, even when legal sanctions have little bite, is then to allow some wrongdoers
to be identified. As a result, social disapproval may be more finely targeted. Admittedly, the
trade-off in our experiment is then that several effects operate simultaneously. A natural extension
of the present paper would therefore be to attempt to disentangle the various effects, as done in
Eisenberg and Engel (2016) in the case of the unilateral accident model, but now in a setting where
individuals interact as both potential victims and potential injurers and where social disapproval is
endogenous.
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A Tables
Table 2: Description of the variables.
Variable Name Description
expGainsit Expected private gains of individual i at round t of undertaking Harmful rather
than Harmless given the situation k(it).
socialGainsit Social contribution to the group welfare of individual i at round t of undertak-
ing Harmful rather than Harmless given the situation k(it).
recDisapit Number of non-monetary punishment points received by individual i at round
t.
recSanctionsit Number of monetary punishment points received by individual i at round t.
HFit Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual i undertakes action Harmful at
round t, 0 if she/he chooses Harmless.
givDisapijt Number of non-monetary punishment points given by individual i to partici-
pant j at round t.
givSanctionsijt Number of monetary punishment points points given by individual i to partic-
ipant j at round t.
historyHFit Proportion of actions Harmful that other group members of individual i un-
dertook until round t.
liablejt Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual j was held liable at round t, 0 other-
wise.
uncompensit Number of uncompensated accidents (other than those of individual i) for
group g(i) at round t.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
expGains 6.505 6.759 -4 16
socialGain .0133 3.151 -4 4
recDisap 6.262 4.615 0 18
recSanctions .789 1.823 0 12
Harmful (HF) .7059 .4557 0 1
givDisap 2.087 2.441 0 6
givSanctions .263 1.032 0 6
historyHF .696 .1839 0 1
liable .2616 .4396 0 1
uncompens .2629 1.032 0 6
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics by treatment
Variable SSL SNR MSL MNR NL
expGains -0.055 5.983 6.205 8.958 11.981
(3.130) (9.078) (3.153) (6.017) (3.199)
socialGain -0.055 -0.0175 0.205 -0.05 -0.0194
(3.130) (3.181) (3.153) (3.097) (3.199)
recDisap 5.63 0.075 6.993 6.628 8.028
(4.970) (0.264) (4.708) (4.232) (4.406)
recSanctions 1.445 0.405 1.118 0.59 0.342
(4.970) (1.391) (1.934) (1.492) (1.160)
Harmful (HF) 0.495 0.5525 0.729 0.82 0.958
(0.500) (0.498) (0.445) (0.384) (0.200)
givDisap 1.877 1.403 2.331 2.209 2.676
(2.429) (2.096) (2.520) (2.469) (2.488)
givSanctions 0.482 0.135 0.373 0.197 0.114
(1.454) (0.730) (1.136) (0.877) (0.677)
historyHF 0.5229 0.566 0.679 0.805 0.929
(0.127) (0.116) (0.119) (0.09) (1.160)
liable 0.495 0.075 0.326 0.15 0
(.500) (0.264) (0.469) (0.367) .
Means. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 5: Structural Econometrics. (N=3,920)
Model Restrictions γ λNL λSL λNR δ LL
(1) λNL = λSL = λNR = δ = 0
.299*** -1439.1(.01)
(2) λNL = λSL = λNR; δ = 0
.471*** .391*** .391*** .391*** -1366.9(.019) (.022) (.022) (.022)
(3) λNL = λSL = λNR
.46*** .349*** .349*** .349*** -.273* -1365.4(.019) (.033) (.035) (.035) (.158)
(4-a) λNL = λNR
.464*** .319*** .488*** .319*** -.141 -1357(.019) (.035) (.045) (.035) (.045)
(4-b) λNL = λSL
.46*** .351*** .351*** .344*** -.276* -1365.4(.02) (.035) (.035) (.044) (.159)
(5) none .463*** .278*** .498*** .374*** -.078 -1355(.019) (.044) (.046) (.044) (.162)
Significance level: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
LL is the log-likelihood.
For Model 4-a: H0 : λNL = λSL; p<1%.
For Model 4-b: H0 : λNL = λNR; p=84.7%.
For Model 5: H0 : λNL = λSL; p<1%.
H0 : λNL = λNR; p<1%.
H0 : λSL = λNR; p<1%.
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Table 6: Regression of the decision to undertake action Harmful.
Method RE Logit
Model (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
Gp 0.588*** 0.552*** 0.563*** 0.769*** 0.765*** 0.599***
(0.0897) (0.0764) (0.0733) (0.169) (0.167) (0.0943)
G 0.237** 0.203** 0.208** 0.285** 0.296** 0.274**
(0.105) (0.0936) (0.0937) (0.129) (0.130) (0.116)
recDisapt−1 -0.0503***
(0.0141)
recDisapt−1 ×HFt−1 -0.0770***
(0.0137)
recDisapt−1 ×HLt−1 0.0429
(0.0499)
recSanctionst−1 -0.139***
(0.0537)
recSanctionst−1 ×HFt−1 -0.202***
(0.0324)
recSanctionst−1 ×HLt−1 -0.0310
(0.0596)
HFt−1 0.431** 0.440***
(0.204) (0.140)
historyHF 1.557
(0.959)
Period 0.0386*** 0.0685*** 0.0699*** 0.143*** 0.137*** 0.0455***
(0.0145) (0.0254) (0.0267) (0.0445) (0.0424) (0.0146)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3920 1960 1960 1,764 1,764 3724
Significance level: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Robust standard errors clustered at the session level.
Control variables include all variables presented in subsection 3.3.
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Table 7: Regression of the decision to undertake action Harmful (cont’d).
Method RE Logit
Model (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
Gp 0.608*** 0.575*** 0.589*** 0.783*** 0.779*** 0.615***
(0.0849) (0.0725) (0.0688) (0.150) (0.149) (0.0906)
G ×1NL 0.167** 0.145* 0.146* 0.201 0.216* 0.190*
(0.0842) (0.0834) (0.0844) (0.126) (0.127) (0.104)
G ×1NR 0.333*** 0.307*** 0.321*** 0.390* 0.392** 0.349***
(0.127) (0.0992) (0.0992) (0.201) (0.193) (0.134)
G ×1SL 0.367*** 0.326*** 0.336*** 0.442*** 0.443*** 0.379***
(0.106) (0.0838) (0.0821) (0.145) (0.142) (0.111)
recDisapt−1 -0.0527***
(0.0124)
recDisapt−1 ×HFt−1 -0.0819***
(0.0506)
recDisapt−1 ×HLt−1 0.0467
(0.0527)
recSanctionst−1 -0.128**
(0.0510)
recSanctionst−1 ×HFt−1 -0.184***
(0.0346)
recSanctionst−1 ×HLt−1 -0.0322
(0.0634)
HFt−1 0.458** 0.411***
(0.203) (0.125)
historyHF 1.042
(0.903)
Period 0.0389*** 0.0712*** 0.0728*** 0.144*** 0.138*** 0.0464***
(0.0145) (0.0257) (0.0271) (0.0443) (0.0423) (0.0151)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3920 1960 1960 1,764 1,764 3724
H0 : βNL = βNR (p-val) 0.051 0.013 0.011 0.317 0.326 0.045
H0 : βNL = βSL (p-val) < 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.031 0.029 0.002
H0 : βNR = βSL (p-val) 0.592 0.6555 0.750 0.723 0.707 0.600
Significance level: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Robust standard errors clustered at the session level.
Control variables include all variables presented in subsection 3.3.
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Table 8: Decision of individual i to give non-monetary or monetary punishment points to individual j at period t.
Method GLS with RE
Non-monetary punishment Monetary punishment
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
liablej 1.191*** 1.809*** 1.735*** 1.733*** 1.726*** 0.211*** 0.261*** 0.238*** 0.211*** 0.210***
(0.184) (0.204) (0.264) (0.249) (0.250) (0.0483) (0.0650) (0.0432) (0.0502) (0.0508)
(1-liablej) pHF 1.493*** 1.470*** 1.437*** 1.452*** 0.115 0.107 0.118 0.120
(0.211) (0.195) (0.211) (0.202) (0.148) (0.134) (0.134) (0.140)
pHF_AB 0.209 0.0579 0.0870 0.0614 0.123 0.127
(0.450) (0.394) (0.387) (0.202) (0.210) (0.223)
recDisapt−1 0.0595*** 0.0844***
(0.0124) (0.0116)
recDisapt−1× HFt−1 -0.0217
(0.0172)
recSanctionst−1 0.0322*** 0.0182
(0.00874) (0.0119)
recSanctionst−1× HFt−1 0.0203
(0.0204)
HFt−1 -0.128 -0.0301
(0.173) (0.110)
Period 0.0536*** 0.0432** 0.0429** 0.0124 0.0116 -0.00938 -0.0102 -0.0103 -0.00763 -0.00740
(0.0193) (0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0201) (0.0196) (0.00871) (0.00975) (0.00990) (0.00991) (0.00975)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Individual × Period) RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
H0 : βliablej = β(1−liablej)pHF 0.0793 0.271 0.150 0.171 0.167 0.286 0.455 0.497
(p-value)
N 5,880 5,880 5,880 5,292 5,292 5,880 5,880 5,880 5,292 5,292
Significance level: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Robust standard errors clustered at the session level.
Control variables include all variables presented in subsection 3.3.
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B Figures
Figure 1: Proportion of actions Harmful across treatments and situations. (Spikes representing 95%
confidence intervals.)
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Figure 2: Prediction of behaviors after logit regression (Model 5, table 5).
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
A B C D
Severe Strict Liability
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
A B C D
Severe Negligence Rule
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
A B C D
No Law
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
A B C D
Mild Strict Liability
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
A B C D
Mild Negligence Rule
33
Figure 3: Average non-monetary punishment points per condemnation status and treatment.
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Figure 4: Average monetary punishment points per condemnation status and treatment.
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Online	Appendix	
Translated	Instructions	
	
	
	
–	Instructions	1	–	
	
Translation:	Original	version	in	French			Welcome	everyone!		You	are	about	to	take	part	in	an	experiment,	and	we	thank	you	for	this.	This	experiment	consists	 of	 three	 parts.	 The	 present	 instructions	 deal	 with	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	experiment	only.	The	instructions	related	to	the	second	and	third	parts	will	be	handed	to	 you	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 each	part.	 If	 the	 instructions	 are	 not	 clear,	 or	 if	 a	 question	remains	unanswered,	please	raise	your	hand	and	wait	for	an	instructor	to	come	to	you.		The	experiment	 includes	moments	of	 individual	decisions	as	well	 as	 interactions	with	other	persons	in	the	room.	At	some	steps	in	the	experiment,	your	decision	may	impact	the	payoff	of	other	participants,	and	reciprocally.	For	this	reason,	it	is	strictly	forbidden	to	communicate	with	other	participants	during	 the	entire	 session.	 In	case	of	violation,	we	will	be	forced	to	exclude	you	from	the	room.		During	the	experiment,	you	will	obtain	ECUs	(Experimental	Currency	Unit).	At	the	end	of	the	experiment,	the	obtained	ECUs	will	be	converted	into	Euros.	The	exchange	rate	is	40	ECUs	for	1	Euro.			The	first	part	of	the	experiment	is	made	of	five	small	games.	Note	that	the	outcomes	of	each	of	these	games	will	be	revealed	at	the	end	of	the	experiment	only.		
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–	Instructions	2	–	
Severe	Strict	Liability	
	
Translation:	Original	version	in	French	
		Thank	 you	 for	 achieving	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 experiment.	 The	 second	 part	 is	 about	 to	start.		In	 this	 second	 part,	 you	 will	 play	 a	 game	 where	 your	 decisions	 will	 affect	 your	 own	payoff	 as	well	 as	 other	 participants’	 revenue.	 This	 game	will	 be	 played	 10	 times.	 For	each	 repetition,	 you	 will	 be	 grouped	 with	 three	 other	 participants.	 Groups	 will	 be	generated	randomly	at	the	beginning	of	each	repetition.	At	the	beginning	of	each	round,	you	will	receive	20	ECU	that	will	be	your	base	revenue.	Then,	you	will	need	to	choose	between	two	actions	that	will	affect	your	revenue:	actions	Y	and	X.	Action	Y	yields	6	ECU	per	round,	whatever	the	situation.	The	revenue	generated	by	 action	 X	 depends	 on	 random	 conditions.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 each	 round,	 you	will	learn	whether	you	are	in	situation	A,	B,	C	or	D.	For	each	of	these	situations,	action	X	will	give	you	14,	16,	20	or	22	ECU	respectively.	The	other	participants	of	your	group	won’t	be	able	to	observe	your	situation	(and	you	won’t	be	able	to	know	theirs).	Situations	A,	B,	C	and	D	have	the	same	probability	to	occur	(25%	each).			Action	Y	affects	only	your	own	revenue.	On	the	contrary,	action	X	negatively	affects	the	revenue	of	the	other	participants	of	your	group:	it	generates	a	loss	of	4	ECU	to	each	of	them.	Thus,	choosing	action	X	will	lead	to	a	total	loss	of	12	ECU	for	the	group	(i.e.	4	ECU	for	each	of	the	three	other	players).	The	table	below	summarizes	the	effects	of	the	two	actions:				 	 Situation	A	 Situation	B	 Situation	C	 Situation	D		 	 (25	%)	 (25	%)	 (25	%)	 (25	%)	Action	Y	 +6	 +6	 +6	 +6	Your	revenue	 Action	X	 +14	 +16	 +20	 +22	Action	Y	 +0	 +0	 +0	 +0	The	revenue	of	each	of	the	other	players	of	your	group	 Action	X	 -4		 -4	 -4	 -4		Once	all	the	participants	of	your	group,	you	included,	have	decided	between	action	X	and	Y,	 the	 computer	 will	 compute	 all	 individual	 payoffs.	 Each	 individual	 who	 has	 caused	damages	to	others	will	have	to	compensate	them.	Thus,	if	you	choose	action	X,	you	will	have	to	compensate	each	other	player	of	the	group	by	4	ECU,	whatever	the	situation	you	are	in.	Your	final	revenue	will	be	equal	to:	•		your	individual	profit	resulting	from	action	X	or	Y	given	the	situation	you	are	in;	•	minus	the	potential	compensations	you	will	have	to	pay	to	the	other	participants	if	you	chose	action	X.	
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After	 this,	you	will	have	 the	possibility	 to	give	disapproval	points	 to	each	of	 the	other	participants	 of	 your	 group.	 You	will	 be	 able	 to	 give	 between	 0	 (no	 disapproval)	 to	 6	(strong	disapproval)	points	to	each	other	player	in	your	group.	The	participants	of	your	group	will	 be	displayed	 in	 an	 anonymous	manner,	with	 a	number-id	 that	 is	 randomly	generated	 and	 renewed	 at	 each	 round.	 Participants	 who	 had	 to	 compensate	 will	 be	showed	 as	 such	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 group.	 After	 each	 participant	 assigned	 his/her	disapproval	 points	 to	 the	 other	 group	 members,	 you	 will	 learn	 the	 total	 number	 of	disapproval	 points	 other	 participants	 gave	 you.	 Disapproval	 points	 don’t	 affect	 your	revenue.		This	game	will	be	played	10	times	in	a	row.	After	each	iteration,	participants	within	the	session	will	be	randomly	rematched.		The	steps	of	the	game	that	will	be	repeated	10	times	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	1) You	are	randomly	matched	in	a	group	of	4	participants.	2) You	decide	to	undertake	action	X	or	Y.	3) Gains	and	losses	associated	to	actions	X	and	Y	as	described	above	take	place.	4) You	 learn	 your	 revenue	 as	well	 as	 how	 it	 has	 been	determined.	 You	 also	 learn	which	individuals	compensated	you.	5) You	assign	disapproval	points	to	each	member	of	your	group.	6) You	learn	the	total	number	of	disapproval	points	others	have	given	you.			
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–	Instructions	2	–	
Severe	Negligence	Rule	
	
Translation:	Original	version	in	French	
		Thank	 you	 for	 achieving	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 experiment.	 The	 second	 part	 is	 about	 to	start.		In	 this	 second	 part,	 you	 will	 play	 a	 game	 where	 your	 decisions	 will	 affect	 your	 own	payoff	 as	well	 as	 other	 participants’	 revenue.	 This	 game	will	 be	 played	 10	 times.	 For	each	 repetition,	 you	 will	 be	 grouped	 with	 three	 other	 participants.	 Groups	 will	 be	generated	randomly	at	the	beginning	of	each	repetition.	At	the	beginning	of	each	round,	you	will	receive	20	ECU	that	will	be	your	base	revenue.	Then,	you	will	need	to	choose	between	two	actions	that	will	affect	your	revenue:	actions	Y	and	X.	Action	Y	yields	6	ECU	per	round,	whatever	the	situation.	The	revenue	generated	by	 action	 X	 depends	 on	 random	 conditions.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 each	 round,	 you	will	learn	whether	you	are	in	situation	A,	B,	C	or	D.	For	each	of	these	situations,	action	X	will	give	you	14,	16,	20	or	22	ECU	respectively.	The	other	participants	of	your	group	won’t	be	able	to	observe	your	situation	(and	you	won’t	be	able	to	know	theirs).	Situations	A,	B,	C	and	D	have	the	same	probability	to	occur	(25%	each).			Action	Y	affects	only	your	own	revenue.	On	the	contrary,	action	X	negatively	affects	the	revenue	of	the	other	participants	of	your	group:	it	generates	a	loss	of	4	ECU	to	each	of	them.	Thus,	choosing	action	X	will	lead	to	a	total	loss	of	12	ECU	for	the	group	(i.e.	4	ECU	for	each	of	the	three	other	players).	The	table	below	summarizes	the	effects	of	the	two	actions:				 	 Situation	A	 Situation	B	 Situation	C	 Situation	D		 	 (25	%)	 (25	%)	 (25	%)	 (25	%)	Action	Y	 +6	 +6	 +6	 +6	Your	revenue	 Action	X	 +14	 +16	 +20	 +22	Action	Y	 +0	 +0	 +0	 +0	The	revenue	of	each	of	the	other	players	of	your	group	 Action	X	 -4		 -4	 -4	 -4		Once	all	the	participants	of	your	group,	you	included,	have	decided	between	action	X	and	Y,	 the	 computer	 will	 compute	 all	 individual	 payoffs.	 Each	 individual	 who	 has	 caused	damages	to	others	in	situations	A	or	B	will	have	to	compensate	them.	Participants	who	undertook	action	X	in	situations	C	or	D	won’t	compensate	for	the	caused	damages.	Thus,	if	you	choose	action	X	in	situations	A	or	B,	you	will	have	to	compensate	each	other	player	of	the	group	by	4	ECU.	Your	final	revenue	will	be	equal	to:	•		your	individual	profit	resulting	from	action	X	or	Y	given	the	situation	you	are	in;	
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•	minus	the	potential	compensations	you	will	have	to	pay	to	the	other	participants	if	you	chose	action	X	(if	you	were	in	situations	A	or	B);	•	minus	 the	potential	damages	caused	by	other	participants	who	chose	action	X	when	they	were	in	situations	C	or	D.	After	 this,	you	will	have	 the	possibility	 to	give	disapproval	points	 to	each	of	 the	other	participants	 of	 your	 group.	 You	will	 be	 able	 to	 give	 between	 0	 (no	 disapproval)	 to	 6	(strong	disapproval)	points	to	each	other	player	in	your	group.	The	participants	of	your	group	will	 be	displayed	 in	 an	 anonymous	manner,	with	 a	number-id	 that	 is	 randomly	generated	 and	 renewed	 at	 each	 round.	 Participants	 who	 had	 to	 compensate	 will	 be	showed	 as	 such	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 group.	 After	 each	 participant	 assigned	 his/her	disapproval	 points	 to	 the	 other	 group	 members,	 you	 will	 learn	 the	 total	 number	 of	disapproval	 points	 other	 participants	 gave	 you.	 Disapproval	 points	 don’t	 affect	 your	revenue.		This	game	will	be	played	10	times	in	a	row.	After	each	iteration,	participants	within	the	session	will	be	randomly	rematched.		The	steps	of	the	game	that	will	be	repeated	10	times	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	1) You	are	randomly	matched	in	a	group	of	4	participants.	2) You	decide	to	undertake	action	X	or	Y.	3) Gains	and	losses	associated	to	actions	X	and	Y	as	described	above	take	place.	4) You	 learn	 your	 revenue	 as	well	 as	 how	 it	 has	 been	determined.	 You	 also	 learn	which	individuals	compensated	you.	5) You	assign	disapproval	points	to	each	member	of	your	group.	6) You	learn	the	total	number	of	disapproval	points	others	have	given	you.			
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–	Instructions	2	–	
Mild	Strict	Liability	
	
Translation:	Original	version	in	French	
		Thank	 you	 for	 achieving	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 experiment.	 The	 second	 part	 is	 about	 to	start.		In	 this	 second	 part,	 you	 will	 play	 a	 game	 where	 your	 decisions	 will	 affect	 your	 own	payoff	 as	well	 as	 other	 participants’	 revenue.	 This	 game	will	 be	 played	 10	 times.	 For	each	 repetition,	 you	 will	 be	 grouped	 with	 three	 other	 participants.	 Groups	 will	 be	generated	randomly	at	the	beginning	of	each	repetition.	At	the	beginning	of	each	round,	you	will	receive	20	ECU	that	will	be	your	base	revenue.	Then,	you	will	need	to	choose	between	two	actions	that	will	affect	your	revenue:	actions	Y	and	X.	Action	Y	yields	6	ECU	per	round,	whatever	the	situation.	The	revenue	generated	by	 action	 X	 depends	 on	 random	 conditions.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 each	 round,	 you	will	learn	whether	you	are	in	situation	A,	B,	C	or	D.	For	each	of	these	situations,	action	X	will	give	you	14,	16,	20	or	22	ECU	respectively.	The	other	participants	of	your	group	won’t	be	able	to	observe	your	situation	(and	you	won’t	be	able	to	know	theirs).	Situations	A,	B,	C	and	D	have	the	same	probability	to	occur	(25%	each).			Action	Y	affects	only	your	own	revenue.	On	the	contrary,	action	X	negatively	affects	the	revenue	of	the	other	participants	of	your	group:	it	generates	a	loss	of	4	ECU	to	each	of	them.	Thus,	choosing	action	X	will	lead	to	a	total	loss	of	12	ECU	for	the	group	(i.e.	4	ECU	for	each	of	the	three	other	players).	The	table	below	summarizes	the	effects	of	the	two	actions:				 	 Situation	A	 Situation	B	 Situation	C	 Situation	D		 	 (25	%)	 (25	%)	 (25	%)	 (25	%)	Action	Y	 +6	 +6	 +6	 +6	Your	revenue	 Action	X	 +14	 +16	 +20	 +22	Action	Y	 +0	 +0	 +0	 +0	The	revenue	of	each	of	the	other	players	of	your	group	 Action	X	 -4		 -4	 -4	 -4		Once	all	the	participants	of	your	group,	you	included,	have	decided	between	action	X	and	Y,	 the	 computer	 will	 compute	 all	 individual	 payoffs.	 Each	 individual	 who	 has	 caused	damages	to	others	will	have	to	compensate	them	if	he/she	is	detected	by	the	computer	(which	occurs	with	a	probability	of	50%),	whatever	the	situation	you	were	 in.	Thus,	 if	you	choose	action	X,	you	will	have	 to	compensate	each	other	player	of	 the	group	by	4	ECU,	whatever	the	situation	you	are	in.	Your	final	revenue	will	be	equal	to:	•		your	individual	profit	resulting	from	action	X	or	Y	given	the	situation	you	are	in;	
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•	minus	the	potential	compensations	you	will	have	to	pay	to	the	other	participants	if	you	chose	action	X	(50%	probability);	•	 minus	 the	 potential	 uncompensated	 damages	 made	 by	 other	 participants	 (50%	probability	if	they	chose	action	X).				After	 this,	you	will	have	 the	possibility	 to	give	disapproval	points	 to	each	of	 the	other	participants	 of	 your	 group.	 You	will	 be	 able	 to	 give	 between	 0	 (no	 disapproval)	 to	 6	(strong	disapproval)	points	to	each	other	player	in	your	group.	The	participants	of	your	group	will	 be	displayed	 in	 an	 anonymous	manner,	with	 a	number-id	 that	 is	 randomly	generated	 and	 renewed	 at	 each	 round.	 Participants	 who	 had	 to	 compensate	 will	 be	showed	 as	 such	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 group.	 After	 each	 participant	 assigned	 his/her	disapproval	 points	 to	 the	 other	 group	 members,	 you	 will	 learn	 the	 total	 number	 of	disapproval	 points	 other	 participants	 gave	 you.	 Disapproval	 points	 don’t	 affect	 your	revenue.		This	game	will	be	played	10	times	in	a	row.	After	each	iteration,	participants	within	the	session	will	be	randomly	rematched.		The	steps	of	the	game	that	will	be	repeated	10	times	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	1) You	are	randomly	matched	in	a	group	of	4	participants.	2) You	decide	to	undertake	action	X	or	Y.	3) Gains	and	losses	associated	to	actions	X	and	Y	as	described	above	take	place.	4) You	 learn	 your	 revenue	 as	well	 as	 how	 it	 has	 been	determined.	 You	 also	 learn	which	individuals	have	compensated	you.	5) You	assign	disapproval	points	to	each	member	of	your	group.	6) You	learn	the	total	number	of	disapproval	points	others	have	given	you.					
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–	Instructions	2	–	
Mild	Negligence	Rule	
	
Translation:	Original	version	in	French	
		Thank	 you	 for	 achieving	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 experiment.	 The	 second	 part	 is	 about	 to	start.		In	 this	 second	 part,	 you	 will	 play	 a	 game	 where	 your	 decisions	 will	 affect	 your	 own	payoff	 as	well	 as	 other	 participants’	 revenue.	 This	 game	will	 be	 played	 10	 times.	 For	each	 repetition,	 you	 will	 be	 grouped	 with	 three	 other	 participants.	 Groups	 will	 be	generated	randomly	at	the	beginning	of	each	repetition.	At	the	beginning	of	each	round,	you	will	receive	20	ECU	that	will	be	your	base	revenue.	Then,	you	will	need	to	choose	between	two	actions	that	will	affect	your	revenue:	actions	Y	and	X.	Action	Y	yields	6	ECU	per	round,	whatever	the	situation.	The	revenue	generated	by	 action	 X	 depends	 on	 random	 conditions.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 each	 round,	 you	will	learn	whether	you	are	in	situation	A,	B,	C	or	D.	For	each	of	these	situations,	action	X	will	give	you	14,	16,	20	or	22	ECU	respectively.	The	other	participants	of	your	group	won’t	be	able	to	observe	your	situation	(and	you	won’t	be	able	to	know	theirs).	Situations	A,	B,	C	and	D	have	the	same	probability	to	occur	(25%	each).			Action	Y	affects	only	your	own	revenue.	On	the	contrary,	action	X	negatively	affects	the	revenue	of	the	other	participants	of	your	group:	it	generates	a	loss	of	4	ECU	to	each	of	them.	Thus,	choosing	action	X	will	lead	to	a	total	loss	of	12	ECU	for	the	group	(i.e.	4	ECU	for	each	of	the	three	other	players).	The	table	below	summarizes	the	effects	of	the	two	actions:				 	 Situation	A	 Situation	B	 Situation	C	 Situation	D		 	 (25	%)	 (25	%)	 (25	%)	 (25	%)	Action	Y	 +6	 +6	 +6	 +6	Your	revenue	 Action	X	 +14	 +16	 +20	 +22	Action	Y	 +0	 +0	 +0	 +0	The	revenue	of	each	of	the	other	players	of	your	group	 Action	X	 -4		 -4	 -4	 -4		Once	all	the	participants	of	your	group,	you	included,	have	decided	between	action	X	and	Y,	 the	 computer	 will	 compute	 all	 individual	 payoffs.	 Each	 individual	 who	 has	 caused	damages	 to	 others	 in	 situations	 A	 or	 B	 will	 have	 to	 compensate	 them,	 if	 he/she	 is	detected	by	 the	 computer	 (which	occurs	with	a	probability	of	50%).	Participants	who	undertook	action	X	in	situations	C	or	D	won’t	compensate	for	the	caused	damages.	Thus,	if	you	choose	action	X	in	situations	A	or	B,	you	will	have	to	compensate	each	other	player	of	the	group	by	4	ECU	with	a	probability	of	50%.	Your	final	revenue	will	be	equal	to:	•		your	individual	profit	resulting	from	action	X	or	Y	given	the	situation	you	are	in;	
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•	minus	the	potential	compensations	you	will	have	to	pay	to	the	other	participants	if	you	chose	action	X	(if	you	were	in	situations	A	or	B)	and	you	were	detected	(probability	of	50%);	•	minus	 the	potential	damages	caused	by	other	participants	who	chose	action	X	when	they	 were	 in	 situations	 C	 or	 D,	 or	 when	 they	 were	 in	 situation	 A	 or	 B	 but	 were	 not	detected.			After	 this,	you	will	have	 the	possibility	 to	give	disapproval	points	 to	each	of	 the	other	participants	 of	 your	 group.	 You	will	 be	 able	 to	 give	 between	 0	 (no	 disapproval)	 to	 6	(strong	disapproval)	points	to	each	other	player	in	your	group.	The	participants	of	your	group	will	 be	displayed	 in	 an	 anonymous	manner,	with	 a	number-id	 that	 is	 randomly	generated	 and	 renewed	 at	 each	 round.	 Participants	 who	 had	 to	 compensate	 will	 be	showed	 as	 such	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 group.	 After	 each	 participant	 assigned	 his/her	disapproval	 points	 to	 the	 other	 group	 members,	 you	 will	 learn	 the	 total	 number	 of	disapproval	 points	 other	 participants	 gave	 you.	 Disapproval	 points	 don’t	 affect	 your	revenue.		This	game	will	be	played	10	times	in	a	row.	After	each	iteration,	participants	within	the	session	will	be	randomly	rematched.		The	steps	of	the	game	that	will	be	repeated	10	times	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	1) You	are	randomly	matched	in	a	group	of	4	participants.	2) You	decide	to	undertake	action	X	or	Y.	3) Gains	and	losses	associated	to	actions	X	and	Y	as	described	above	take	place.	4) You	 learn	 your	 revenue	 as	well	 as	 how	 it	 has	 been	determined.	 You	 also	 learn	which	individuals	compensated	you.	5) You	assign	disapproval	points	to	each	member	of	your	group.	6) You	learn	the	total	number	of	disapproval	points	others	have	given	you.						
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–	Instructions	2	–	
No	Law	
	
Translation:	Original	version	in	French	
		Thank	 you	 for	 achieving	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 experiment.	 The	 second	 part	 is	 about	 to	start.		In	 this	 second	 part,	 you	 will	 play	 a	 game	 where	 your	 decisions	 will	 affect	 your	 own	payoff	 as	well	 as	 other	 participants’	 revenue.	 This	 game	will	 be	 played	 10	 times.	 For	each	 repetition,	 you	 will	 be	 grouped	 with	 three	 other	 participants.	 Groups	 will	 be	generated	randomly	at	the	beginning	of	each	repetition.	At	the	beginning	of	each	round,	you	will	receive	20	ECU	that	will	be	your	base	revenue.	Then,	you	will	need	to	choose	between	two	actions	that	will	affect	your	revenue:	actions	Y	and	X.	Action	Y	yields	6	ECU	per	round,	whatever	the	situation.	The	revenue	generated	by	 action	 X	 depends	 on	 random	 conditions.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 each	 round,	 you	will	learn	whether	you	are	in	situation	A,	B,	C	or	D.	For	each	of	these	situations,	action	X	will	give	you	14,	16,	20	or	22	ECU	respectively.	The	other	participants	of	your	group	won’t	be	able	to	observe	your	situation	(and	you	won’t	be	able	to	know	theirs).	Situations	A,	B,	C	and	D	have	the	same	probability	to	occur	(25%	each).			Action	Y	affects	only	your	own	revenue.	On	the	contrary,	action	X	negatively	affects	the	revenue	of	the	other	participants	of	your	group:	it	generates	a	loss	of	4	ECU	to	each	of	them.	Thus,	choosing	action	X	will	lead	to	a	total	loss	of	12	ECU	for	the	group	(i.e.	4	ECU	for	each	of	the	three	other	players).	The	table	below	summarizes	the	effects	of	the	two	actions:				 	 Situation	A	 Situation	B	 Situation	C	 Situation	D		 	 (25	%)	 (25	%)	 (25	%)	 (25	%)	Action	Y	 +6	 +6	 +6	 +6	Your	revenue	 Action	X	 +14	 +16	 +20	 +22	Action	Y	 +0	 +0	 +0	 +0	The	revenue	of	each	of	the	other	players	of	your	group	 Action	X	 -4		 -4	 -4	 -4		Once	all	the	participants	of	your	group,	you	included,	have	decided	between	action	X	and	Y,	 the	 computer	will	 compute	 all	 individual	 payoffs.	 Your	 revue	will	 be	 equal	 to	 your	individual	payoff	resulting	from	action	X	and	Y	given	the	situation	you	were	in,	and	the	potential	damages	caused	by	other	participants.	After	 this,	you	will	have	 the	possibility	 to	give	disapproval	points	 to	each	of	 the	other	participants	 of	 your	 group.	 You	will	 be	 able	 to	 give	 between	 0	 (no	 disapproval)	 to	 6	(strong	disapproval)	points	to	each	other	player	in	your	group.	The	participants	of	your	group	will	 be	displayed	 in	 an	 anonymous	manner,	with	 a	number-id	 that	 is	 randomly	generated	 and	 renewed	 at	 each	 round.	 After	 each	 participant	 assigned	 his/her	
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disapproval	 points	 to	 the	 other	 group	 members,	 you	 will	 learn	 the	 total	 number	 of	disapproval	 points	 other	 participants	 gave	 you.	 Disapproval	 points	 don’t	 affect	 your	revenue.		This	game	will	be	played	10	times	in	a	row.	After	each	iteration,	participants	within	the	session	will	be	randomly	rematched.		The	steps	of	the	game	that	will	be	repeated	10	times	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	1) You	are	randomly	matched	in	a	group	of	4	participants.	2) You	decide	to	undertake	action	X	or	Y.	3) Gains	and	losses	associated	to	actions	X	and	Y	as	described	above	take	place.	4) You	learn	your	revenue	as	well	as	how	it	has	been	determined.		5) You	assign	disapproval	points	to	each	member	of	your	group.	6) You	learn	the	total	number	of	disapproval	points	others	have	given	you.				
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-	Instructions	3	–	
	
Translation:	Original	version	in	French			Thank	 you	 for	 having	 completed	 the	 second	 part	 of	 the	 experiment.	 The	 third	 part	 is	about	to	start.			In	 this	 third	 part	 of	 the	 experiment,	 you	 will	 be	 asked	 to	 play	 the	 same	 game	 as	previously	 with	 a	 modification	 of	 the	 rules.	 Indeed,	 the	 disapproval	 points	 described	previously	will	be	replaced	by	sanction	points.	A	sanction	point	costs	you	0.5	ECU	and	decreases	the	targeted	person’s	revenue	by	0.5	ECU.			The	 game	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 same	way	 as	 before,	with	 the	 only	 exception	 of	 sanction	points.	 This	 new	 game	 will	 be	 repeated	 10	 times	 with	 random	 rematching	 at	 each	repetition.						
